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We studied spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt games where both the strategy distribution and the
players’ individual noise level could evolve to reach higher individual payoff. Players are located on the sites of
different two-dimensional lattices and gain their payoff from games with their neighbors by choosing uncondi-
tional cooperation or defection. The way of strategy adoption can be characterized by a single K (temperature-
like) parameter describing how strongly adoptions depend on the payoff-difference. If we start the system from
a random strategy distribution with many different player specific K parameters, the simultaneous evolution of
strategies and K parameters drives the system to a final stationary state where only one K value remains. In the
coexistence phase of cooperator and defector strategies the surviving K parameter is in good agreement with
the noise level that ensures the highest cooperation level if uniform K is supposed for all players. In this paper
we give a thorough overview about the properties of this evolutionary process.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory has attracted great interest re-
cently from many scientific fields [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Physicists,
biologists, economists and many other scientists have found it
challenging to study multi-agent evolutionary systems.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game [4, 6] is an excellent
toy model to describe the sharpest conflict situation between
individual and common interest as it contains all the basic fea-
tures of such interactions. The original PD game is a two-
person one-shot game where players can choose between two
types of behavior, to cooperate or to defect. They earn payoffs
according to the simultaneous decisions of both participants.
A cooperator gets the ’sucker’s payoff (S) against a defector,
while successful defection yields the temptation to defect (T )
for the defector. Mutual cooperation is rewarded byR for each
player, while two defectors (receiving payoff P ) punish each
other with the defective behavior. The game is a classical PD
game if the payoffs accomplish the relation T > R > P > S.
This inequality causes two selfish (rational) players to defect
independently of the other players decision, thus they get the
second worst payoff instead of the second best one for mutual
cooperation resulting in a dilemma situation. If R > T , the
social dilemma is weakened because the unilateral deviation
from the mutual cooperation is not beneficial [7]. In the latter
so-called Stag Hunt (SH) game to act identically to the part-
ner’s strategy would result the highest payoff similarly to the
Coordination game.
The introduction of spatiality [8] revealed fundamentally
new solutions of the game, which cannot be detected in the
well-mixed situation. In spatial evolutionary models, players
are located on the sites of a network where the links of the
network define their possible connections. Players gain their
accumulated payoff from games with their immediate neigh-
bors and sometimes - according to the evolutionary dynamics
- they can adopt the strategy of a neighbor. Usually the strat-
egy adoption probability depends on the payoff difference and
in accordance with the Darwinian principle, individuals with
higher payoff (fitness) have a greater chance to supersede the
less successful ones. Due to the spatial scenario, cooperation
can survive in the system, even if only the simplest strate-
gies are allowed, i.e. unconditional cooperation and defec-
tion. Here, cooperators form clusters and support each other
through the short range local interactions while defectors pun-
ish each other with mutual defection. The invasion processes
along the borders of the clusters depend on the irregularity of
the interface, the underlying network(s), and the evolutionary
dynamical rule.
The PD game was studied on many types of networks (dif-
ferent lattices [9, 10, 11], scale-free graphs [12], small world
networks [13], etc.), investigating the effect of basic topolog-
ical features on the measure of cooperation. To reduce the
number of degrees of freedom, evolving networks [14] were
examined, too. In these models, players have the opportunity
to change their neighbors during the evolutionary process to
attempt to increase their income, i.e., the strategy distribution
and the connectivity graph co-evolve. As a result of this evo-
lution, highly cooperative communities could be established.
The simultaneous change of strategy and a player-specific
parameter, has been extended to other quantities, too. For ex-
ample, Fort [15] studied models where the elements of payoff
matrix were inherited in parallel with the strategy adoption.
The evolution of the strategy pass capability [16] or the inter-
action range of players [17] are also discussed. Moyano and
Sanchez [18] studied the competition between several pairs of
dynamical rules controlling the strategy adoption in the sys-
tem. The latter results have motivated us to study the evolution
of a noise-related parameter [19], which frequently character-
izes the uncertainty in the adoption process [11]. Many things
can cause this uncertainty, such as temporal or spatial fluctua-
tions in the payoff values, errors in decision or in perception,
emotions, individual point of view (free will), etc. The role of
the noise parameter at different underlying graphs was stud-
ied thoroughly in several studies [20, 21, 22]. It turned out
that on structures that can be fully perambulated by stepping
only on overlapping triangles (i.e., on structures with triangle
percolation), cooperation could be maintained in the widest
parameter range when the measure of noise was minimal [20].
While on structures without triangle percolation, the optimal
measure of noise for cooperation is shifted to positive values.
2In this article, we study the simulatenous evolutions of
noise parameter - as the quantity characterizing the adoption
rule - and strategy distributions on different, relevant struc-
tures. Square lattice and the kagome lattice will be analyzed
as good examples for graphs with and without triangle perco-
lation. In our model, players can apply different noise param-
eter and during the evolutionary process, they can adopt not
only the strategy of another neighboring player but also the
individual noise parameter. In other words, a player can learn
not only a more successful strategy but also the way how suc-
cessful player reacts to the payoff differences, i.e. his adoption
rule. The two elementary, evolutionary steps are independent.
We will show that as a result of this dynamics, only one noise
level remains in the final state even if several strategies can co-
exist in the co-existence region and the remaining noise level
is close to the one providing the highest cooperation for sys-
tems with homogeneous noise distribution. In a previous letter
[19] we have considered only the case of weak PD. Now the
latter investigation is extended to the parameters over the lim-
its of the weak PD and SH games by revealing the connection
of cooperation density surface and the location of fixed noise
level. Finally we briefly discuss what happens if not only the
strategies and the way of strategy adoption but also the pay-
off matrix are allowed to adopt throughout the same imitation
mechanism. We used Monte Carlo (MC) simulations and an
extended version of the dynamical mean-field approximation
(detailed here) to perform the investigations.
II. THE MODEL
In our model, players are located on the sites x of a square
(consisting of L×L sites with periodic boundary conditions)
or a kagome lattice (3×L×L sites). These interaction graphs
can be used as the two representatives of the characteristic fea-
tures of two-dimensional lattices, i.e. lattices with and with-
out triangle percolation. Players can follow one of the sim-
plest strategies that is unconditional cooperation (sx = C)
or unconditional defection (sx = D). They gain their cumu-
lated payoffs from one-shot PD games with their four nearest
neighbors. To reduce the necessary parameters we are us-
ing a re-scaled payoff matrix suggested by Nowak and May
[23] where the reward of mutual cooperation is R = 1 while
mutual defection yields P = 0 income. A cooperator gains
S = 0 payoff when facing a defector while a successful de-
fector gets the temptation to defect (T = b). We investigate
an extended parameter space 0 < b < 2 to explore the SH
region, too, while S = 0 refers to the so-called weak PD for
1 < b < 2.
For the MC simulations, we use random initial strategy dis-
tribution where both C and D strategies are present with the
same frequency. Beside the strategy, each player possesses
another parameter describing his willingness to make rational
decision: having individual adoption rule (Kx). This parame-
ter can be interpreted as a personal noise parameter as it con-
tains the possible uncertainty factors in the strategy adoption.
Such factors can emerge from the fluctuation of payoff param-
eters, changing of environment, errors in decision, individual
freedom to risk a given amount of income, etc. depending on
the situation which is modelled. In our model, initially, we
associate an adoption parameter Kx to every player from a fi-
nite set, that is, Kx ∈ {K1,K2, . . . ,Kn} where n denotes the
number of different K values.
During the evolutionary process, we choose two neighbor-
ing players (x and y) randomly, and we calculate their ac-
cumulated payoffs (Px and Py) gained from PD games with
their neighbors. In an elementary evolutionary step, player x
can adopt the strategy sy and/or the noise value Ky of player
y with the probability
W =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/Kx]
. (1)
The possible adoption of the strategy and the noise value hap-
pens independently of each other, i.e., it is possible that only
one of them is adopted in an elementary step. As the Dar-
winian principle dictates, forPy−Px ≫ Kx, both the strategy
and the adoption rule of player y is very likely to be adopted.
According to the proposed protocol, the adoption rule of
player y (Ky) can still be adopted even if the strategies are the
same (sx = sy). As a consequence, the adoptions of strate-
gies and rules can end independently arriving to one of the
absorbing states formed by identical strategies and/or uniform
adoption rules. In the absence of mutation the system cannot
leave these states.
In general, the existence of many absorbing states can cause
technical difficulties in the interpretation of numerical results
achieved on small systems. For small sizes the system evolve
quickly into one of the absorbing states despite the existence
(”long-time stability”) of a mixed state in the limit L → ∞.
These difficulties can be avoided by using sufficiently large
system sizes that increases the duration of simulations. We
will show, however, that the significantly faster simulations
on small systems can also be utilized to extract accurate quan-
tities characterizing the behavior of the present evolutionary
games.
As we stressed, we used the same adoption probability for
both evolving quantities determined by Eq. 1. However, the
time scales of evolutions can be distinguished, namely the
strategy or the noise parameter may evolve faster or slower.
Such a time scale separation of coevolving quantities was al-
ready studied in several earlier works [14, 24]. An interesting
observation was the shift of effective payoff elements if the
link of players, as an evolving quantity, change much faster
than their strategies. In our case the time separation can be
easily done by adding a multiplicative 0 < Q < 1 prefactor to
the transition rate of evolving quantity resulting a slower evo-
lution comparing to the other one. Simulations show the fixed
K⋆ noise value is robust: the system arrives into the same
state independently on the time scale separation of evolving
quantities. The fixation time, however, depends strongly on
the applied Q parameter. Accordingly, the results presented
in the next sections are corresponding to the Q = 1 case.
Starting the system from a random distribution of strategies
and noise parameters the iteration of the above elementary
processes governs an evolutionary process that can be quanti-
fied by recording the fraction ρC(t) of cooperators as well as
3the portion νKi(t) of players following the dynamical ruleKi.
In one time unit (called MC step, in short, MCS) each player
has a chance once on average to adopt a strategy and/or noise
value of a neighbor.
Finally we mention that for homogeneous dynamical rule
(Kx = K , ∀x) the present model is identical to a previously
studied spatial model [20] as discussed briefly below. Further-
more, for homogeneous strategy distribution [sx = C (or D),
∀x] all the players receive the same payoff [Px = 4 (or 0),
∀x] and the adoption probability (1) becomes uniform, i.e.,
W = 1/2 and the evolution of the Kx distribution becomes
identical to the process described by the n-state voter model
[25].
III. SELECTION OF NOISE LEVEL ON SQUARE
LATTICE
First we briefly outline the outcome if all players have the
same adoption parameter (Kx = K , ∀x), i.e., if only the strat-
egy distribution can evolve [20, 21, 22]. In this case, on lat-
tices as underlying graphs, we can usually distinguish three
regions when increasing b for a fixed K parameter. Only
cooperators remain in the final state after a transient time if
b < bc1(K). On the contrary, for bc2(K) < b, defectors
prevail. While the C and D strategies coexist in the region
bc1(K) < b < bc2(K) where the concentration of cooper-
ators decreases continuously from 1 to 0 when increasing b
from bc1(K) to bc2(K). The continuous phase transitions at
the two threshold values belong to the directed percolation
universality class [11, 26]. For uniform K values the major
feature of this system can be summarized in a b − K phase
diagram [20] where the curves bc1(K) and bc2(K) denote the
phase boundaries separating the homogeneous D, the coex-
isting C + D, and the homogeneous C phases as it is partly
illustrated in the inset of Fig. 1 or Fig. 6b.
The systematic analysis of the proposed evolutionary pro-
cess has justified the existence of a distinguished noise
level K⋆(b) within the (C + D) coexistence region for
any fixed b (on square lattice the corresponding region is
bmin = 0.940(3) < b < bmax = 1.078(1) where the
borders are the minimum and maximum values of bc1(K)
and bc2(K) functions.). Figure 1a shows what happens if
K⋆ ∈ {K1,K2, . . . ,Kn} for n = 5. In this case the fi-
nal state with players using the same K⋆ rule is reached after
about 1000 MCS independent of L, if L >∼ 500.
The speed of relaxation towards the homogeneous Kx =
K⋆ state is strongly influenced by the initial set of possibleKi
values. The lower plot of Fig. 1 illustrates a situation where
the four additional Ki values are very close to the distin-
guishedK⋆ value. Although the evolution of adoption rules is
still straightforward, but the relevant increase in the relaxation
time may be related to the smaller difference in driving force
favoring Kx = K⋆ at the expense of others. Similar slow-
ing down can be observed if n is increased while the maximal
value of Ki is limited. Anyway, the upper limitation of the
range of possible Ki values [(assuming that max(Ki) > K⋆]
does not influence the final results because the strategy adop-
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FIG. 1: (color online) The time dependence of the fraction of initial
Ki values (νK ) demonstrate the selection of the distinguished adop-
tion rule K⋆ (indicated by arrow in the inset) if four other rules (Ki)
are permitted in the initial state on the square lattice at b = 1.05
(upper panel). The inset, as part of the b−K phase diagram, shows
the initial K values chosen from the coexistence (C + D) and ab-
sorbing (D) region as well. Lower panel illustrates the same evolu-
tion if the additional four dynamical rules are closer to K⋆, namely,
Ki = K
⋆ + 0.05(i − 2) for i = 1, ..., n = 5. For both cases the
linear system size was L = 1000.
tion using the largest Ki value dies out first (see Fig. 1).
The above results raise the question: What happens if the
initial set of dynamical rules is out of the range of (C + D)
coexistence phase? (It also happens if b < bmin or b > bmax.)
In this case the cooperators (or defectors) die out soon and the
adoption of noise levels becomes random as it is described by
the voter model predicting a behavior dependent on the spatial
dimension d. Namely, algebraically growing domains of the
same Ki values occur on the one-dimensional lattice (d = 1),
the typical size of homogeneous domains increases with ln(t)
if d = 2, and the system remains inhomogeneous for d ≥ 3
[25, 27]. According to the above theoretical prediction a very
slow (logarithmic) coarsening will be observed. This case is
demonstrated in Fig. 2, where the initial Ki values are in the
all D phase. For the given simulation the cooperators have
died out at t = text = 2600 MCS resulting the conditions of
voter model. Afterwards a coarsening without surface tension
4starts represented by huge fluctuations in νKi functions. The
semi-log scale demonstrates clearly that the absorbing state is
reached after a long coarsening time. (To drive the eye we
have plotted a log t function, too.) In the final state all the
players use the same noise level. In principle, any of the per-
sistent rules (Ki) can invade the whole finite system with a
probability νKi(text) due to the fluctuations.
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FIG. 2: (color online) Time dependence of the fraction of the three
Ki values on square lattice at b = 1.05 and L = 1000. The in-
set shows the position of the initial Ki values in the homogeneous
D region. The arrow points to the time text when the C strategy
became extinct. Solid line shows a log t function illustrating loga-
rithmic coarsening in the final period.
Several simulations were performed to study the cases
where the initial Ki values are positioned in both sides of the
range of (C +D) coexistence. The results indicated a quali-
tatively similar behavior plotted in Fig. 2.
Beside the large fluctuations for t > text Fig. 2 shows a
smooth and deterministic variation in νKi(t) within the period
where both C and D strategies exist. This feature has inspired
us to study the effect of strategy mutation on the Darwinian
selection of noise levels in the regions where only cooperators
(b < bmin) or defectors (b > bmax) would remain alive if the
evolution was controlled by only imitations. For this purpose,
in a few simulations, the above mentioned evolutionary rule
is extended by allowing each player to change her strategy
(from C to D or conversely) with a small probability ε. Fig-
ure 3 shows that slightly above bmax the Darwinian selection
favors also a distinguished rule K⋆(b = 1.1) ≃ 0.25 (in the
presence of rare mutations) that can be considered as the ana-
lytical continuation of K⋆(b) obtained within the coexistence
region. Evidently, the favored rule depends on both b and ε.
As the spreading of the distinguished noise level is catalyzed
by the mutants, the speed of this process vanishes with ε.
If we take b < bmin value, being in the SH region, the intro-
duction of small mutations will result a fixation value that can
be also considered as an analytical continuation of fixed K⋆
values from the b > bmin interval. Namely, only small K ≈ 0
values survive and the fixation time increases drastically as b
decreases. Instead of the further analysis of the effect of muta-
tions henceforth our attention will be focused on the behavior
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FIG. 3: (color online) Time dependence of the fraction of ten Ki
values, distributed equidistantly from K1 = 0.05 to K10 = 0.5, on
square lattice in the presence of rare mutations (ε = 0.02) at b = 1.1
and L = 1000. Labels indicate the closest Ki values to K⋆.
of K⋆(b) in the (C +D) coexistence phase in the absence of
mutation.
The above mentioned features of the selection of dynami-
cal rules refer to serious technical difficulties (related to the
long runs on large lattice) in the determination of K⋆(b) with
an adequate accuracy. It turned out, however, that this quan-
tity can be evaluated more efficiently by repeating simula-
tions with only two possible Ki values on small systems.
In this case (n = 2) we choose a simple notation, namely
K1 = K −∆K/2 and K2 = K +∆K/2. For small sizes the
random initial state evolves rapidly into one of the absorbing
phases where all the players use uniformly the value K1 or
K2. Starting from different (random) initial states these simu-
lations are repeated many times (typicallyNr = 2000) and the
preference of the second rule (K2) is measured by the quan-
tity f = g(K2) − g(K1) where g(Ki) is the probability that
the evolution ends up in the absorbing state with players using
uniformly the rule Ki. As the simulations hold until reaching
one of the absorbing states therefore g(K1) + g(K2) = 1 and
f varies from -1 to +1. Similar quantities are used frequently
for the investigations of finite systems within the framework
of Moran process [28].
Figure 4 demonstrates the results of these investigations
when varying the value of K and ∆K for a fixed system size
L and b. According to MC data the position of K⋆, where the
sign of f changes, is independent of the value of ∆K within
the statistical error. f varies linearly with K in the close vicin-
ity of K = K⋆ [more precisely, f ∼ (K⋆ −K)]. Naturally,
larger ∆K involves larger difference in the “driving force” fa-
voring one of them. This fact can be demonstrated by the data
collapse when choosing a more suitable scale for the vertical
axes.
Figure 4 shows that f decreases smoothly if K is increased
for L = 40. Evidently, this transition becomes sharper if we
choose larger systems as demonstrated in Fig. 5. According to
these data the system size influences only the absolute value
of f and the functions f(K) becomes zero at K = K⋆ inde-
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FIG. 4: MC results for the measure f of preference between two
dynamical rules as a function of K on a square lattice of 40×40 sites
for b = 1.05 if ∆K = 0.005 (circles), ∆K = 0.01 (open boxes),
and ∆K = 0.02 (closed boxes). Inset: data collapse when scaling
f by 1/∆K suggesting the identification of the preferred adoption
rule is independent of the magnitude of ∆K.
pendently of the system size if it is large enough. In the limit
L→∞ a step-like transition (from 1 to -1 at K⋆) is expected.
To sum up, the position of K⋆ can be determined by using
only one ∆K value at small system size, which reduces the
necessary fixation time drastically.
The positive (negative) value of f indicates the parameter
region where the system can evolve towards larger (smaller)
Kx values through weak mutations in Kx during the adoption
processes. Within this context K⋆ in Fig. 4 can be considered
as an attractor.
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FIG. 5: The measure of preference between the dynamical rules of
K1 and K2 versus K on a square lattice for different sizes [L = 160
(open circles), 80 (closed boxes), 40 (open boxes), and 20 (closed
circles)] if ∆K = 0.01 and b = 1.05.
The above features are utilized in the accurate determina-
tion of K⋆ for a given value of b. In our previous work [19]
these calculations are repeated to determine the distinguished
rule (K⋆) for different b values within the range of weak Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. Now this analysis is extended to the whole
range of b (i.e., bmin < b < bmax) and the results are summa-
rized in Fig. 6b.
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FIG. 6: (color online) The surface of stationary cooperator density
(ρ) as a function of b and K parameters when homogeneous K distri-
bution is supposed on square lattice. Closed circles and thick (green)
line show the position of K⋆(b) favored by the Darwinian selection
of dynamical rules for fixed b. In the lower panel K⋆(b) and the
phase boundaries (separating the homogeneous D, the mixed C+D,
and the homogeneous C phases) are projected on the b − K plane.
For comparison, the positions of local maxima in the cooperator den-
sity ρ for fixed b are denoted by the dotted (blue) line. The dashed
(black) line is just to mark the border between weak PD and SH
games at b = 1.
In order to get deeper understanding about the fixation of
noise levels, the cooperator density [ρ(K)] profiles are illus-
trated above the whole b−K plane (see Fig. 6a). The plotted
ρ(K) curves are obtained for fixed b. In the simulations we
used the following system parameters: system sizes of 105-
106 players, relaxation time of 5·105-106 MCS and 105-2·105
more MCS for averaging to get the steady state cooperator
density values. Larger system sizes and longer simulation
times were needed in the vicinity of the critical points. The
statistical errors of the plotted data are comparable with the
line thickness.
Each plotted ρ(K) curve (for fixed b) shows a local maxi-
mum in the range of weak PD (b > 1). The plot of Fig. 6b
demonstrates clearly that the values of K⋆(b) are close to the
site where the cooperator density ρ has a local maximum for
the given b. Although the position of the local maxima in the
average payoff and ρ (for fixed b) are distinguishable, the dif-
ference between these positions is small and comparable with
the size of symbols as discussed in [19].
Within the region of SH game (b < 1) Fig. 6 shows a
significantly different behavior. First we emphasize that the
surface ρ(K, b) exhibits a valley within the coexistence re-
6gion, otherwise ρ = 1. More precisely, for fixed b the curve
ρ(K) differs from 1 within the coexistence region [namely, if
Kc1(b) < K < Kc2(b) assuming that b > bmin] and has a
local minimum. It turned out that within this region the Dar-
winian selection of noise values prefers also a distinguished
rule that is positioned at the left edge of the ”valley”, that is,
K⋆(b) = Kc1(b). This means, that if we study a system with
only two initial rules (K1 and K2 both within the coexistence
region) then the smaller one will spread in the whole system
in the final state.
For uniform dynamical rule (Kx = K) on the square lattice
with nearest neighbor interactions both bc1(K) and bc2(K)
(the phase boundaries in Fig. 6b) go to 1 if K tends to either
0 or ∞ in such a way that one can observe an optimal noise
level for the cooperators in the PD region and another one for
the defectors in the SH games. In other words ρ(K) curves
have a local maximum (minimum) in the PD (SH) region. As
it was shown by a previous study [21] the local maximum
of cooperation level is related to the absence of overlapping
triangles (three-site cliques) of interaction graph. The com-
parison of the mentioned surface and the fixation values of Ki
for both games in Fig. 6 suggest that the possible evolution of
strategy adoption rule will drive the system into a state that
ensures closely the optimal cooperation level independently
of the studied dilemma game. In the subsequent section we
will consider another type of connectivity structure exhibiting
a slightly different behavior.
IV. RESULTS ON KAGOME LATTICE
In real human connectivity structures a relevant portion
of the neighbors of a player x is also connected to each
other (that is, the so-called clustering coefficient is sufficiently
large) [29]. The main effect of this topological feature can
be well investigated if the players are distributed on the sites
of the two-dimensional kagome lattice where each player has
also four neighbors. The latter feature makes possible to ex-
clude the additional impact by changing coordination number.
The systematic investigation of the evolutionary PD game on
this connectivity structure has explored a basically different
phase diagram in comparison with that observed on the square
lattice [20]. It turned out that the upper threshold value of
temptation [bc2(K)] decreases monotonously from 3/2 to 1
if K is increased from 0 to ∞. Due to the different limit of
bc2(K) threshold values, one can also expect basically differ-
ent behavior in the Darwinian selection of noise levels for the
PD.
The monotonous K dependence of ρ in the low noise limit
is related to presence of the overlapping triangles that sup-
port the spreading of cooperators through the lattice [21].
In fact, the MC simulations indicate similar behavior for
many other regular connectivity structures (including two- and
three-dimensional lattices and some other regular networks)
where the overlapping triangles span the whole system. Thus
the kagome lattice can be considered as a sample representing
the latter type of interaction graphs.
Here it is worth mentioning that the low Ki (or K) values
lead to diverging simulation times and cause technical diffi-
culties in the quantification of the low noise behavior. The
subsequent results were extracted from a set of simulations
where Ki ≥ Kmin = 0.002 is chosen for all i.
As we observed in case of square lattice topology, the fixa-
tion of evolving K values is in close connection to the surface
of maximal cooperation when using homogeneous dynamical
rules (Kx = K). Therefore, the same surface on K − b plane
is determined for kagome lattice as plotted in Fig. 7a.
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FIG. 7: The same plot as Fig. 6 for kagome lattice. The cooperation
level (upper panel) has minima in the SH region and maxima in the
PD area. The maximum at positive K decreases as b increases and
is replaced by a maximum at K = 0 if b exceeds a threshold value
(bth = 1.182). Bullets and thick green line mark the main attractor
while the positions of maximal cooperation level are also denoted by
dotted blue line.
For the PD game (b > 1) the ρ(K) curves (for fixed b) vary
continuously from nonzero value of ρ(K = 0) until reach-
ing the absorbing state (ρ = 0). We can distinguish differ-
ent types of behaviors although the accurate separation of the
corresponding regions of parameter is prevented by the above
mentioned technical difficulties. From the extrapolation of
the low noise behavior monotonously decreasing ρ(K) can
be concluded if K is increased from zero to infinity at 3/2 >
b >∼ 1.4. In the subsequent region, 1.4 >∼ b > bth = 1.182,
the curves ρ(K) possess only one local maximum close to
K = 0. At b = bth, with a sudden jump there appears an-
other local maximum while the other local maximum close to
K = 0 still exist to b = 1. The absolute maximum is the one
belonging to larger K value. This behavior indicates that the
triangle percolation added a support for cooperation for lower
noise values and the cooperator density profile can be derived
as the superposition of a plateau originated from the triangle
percolation effect and the normal one-peak profile of a lattice.
In the region of SH game (b < 1) the ρ(K) curves are resem-
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FIG. 8: The same plot as Fig. 5 but using kagome lattice topology
at b = 1.1 and ∆K = 0.01. The system sizes are 3 × L × L =
3×20×20 (closed circles), 3×40×40 (open boxes), and 3×80×80
(closed boxes). The plot demonstrates clearly the existence of two
attracting fixed points at K⋆ = 0 and at K⋆ = 0.212 where the
border of attraction of fixation values is at Ksep = 0.038.
bling those discussed in the previous section. As well as for
the square lattice the function bc1(K) goes to 1 if K tends to
zero or infinity.
Our conjecture, based on the close relation of the fixed
noise level and the optimal cooperation level of homogeneous
K system, is completely supported by the evolution of adop-
tion rules on kagome topology, too. More precisely, in the SH
region the Ki values of coexistence C +D phase drift to the
minimal K value to reach Kc1(b) that ensures the maximal
cooperation (ρ = 1). Technically, if we choose two initial
Ki values from the coexistence region than the lower K value
will spread eventually in the whole population. At high values
of b in the PD region the final value of noise parameter is al-
ways the lowest among the initial set signalling K⋆ ≈ 0. This
feature is related to the fact that cooperation level always has
a local maximum at K ≈ 0. Decreasing b, however, a bifur-
cation occurs at b = 1.185: besides the K⋆ ≈ 0 fixed point a
new attractor appears located at a positive K value. The pres-
ence of two attractors are demonstrated in Fig. 8 where the
measure of preference, is plotted by means of K . In this b re-
gion the initial Ki values always destine at K⋆ ≈ 0 if they are
belowKsep(b) value. (The position of separator, as the border
of basins of attractors will be discussed in the next section.) If
Ki > Ksep, the adoption rules converge to the above men-
tioned K⋆ 6= 0 value. Naturally, if all Ki > Kc, means all Ki
values are from the absorbing D phase, similar behavior can
be observed as shown in Fig. 2.
An interesting situation occurs when the initial Ki values
are distributed from the whole (0,Kc) interval. In this case,
only K⋆ 6= 0 fixed point survives, signalling that the latter
is the stronger attractor. As expected, the position of positive
K⋆ attractor is close to the K value where maximal coopera-
tion level is measured for homogeneous K model. Summing
up our observations for both representative topologies and for
both dilemma games, it is concluded that the system sponta-
neously will evolve to a state that is favorable for cooperation
if the adjustment of noise (strategy adoption) is allowed.
V. DYNAMICAL CLUSTER APPROXIMATIONS
Beside the MC simulations, we performed dynamical clus-
ter approximations [5] on kagome lattice. The choice of
kagome lattice for this type of investigation was motivated by
its simplicity. To highlight the difficulties in the application
of these sophisticated technique first we emphasize that nei-
ther the mean-field (one-site) nor the pair (two-site) approx-
imations were capable to give an adequate description of the
homogeneous K model, particularly in the low noise limit.
On the square lattice, a higher level of approximation (four-
site approach) is needed to reproduce qualitatively the results
of MC simulations. Furthermore, a more demanding nine-site
level is necessary to reach an adequate accuracy. On the con-
trary, the three-site (triangular) approximation can reproduce
quantitatively well the results of MC simulations on kagome
lattice.
Now we briefly survey this method for a simple case where
each site x has only two states (sx = C or D) and later we
give the main details of the extension to the four-state systems
that is necessary to describe our present model (for a more
detailed description see the papers [5, 30, 31] with further ref-
erences therein). Within the framework of this approximation
the system is characterized by all possible configuration prob-
abilities p3(sα, sβ , sγ) on a block of three neighboring sites
forming a regular triangle on the kagome lattice (α, β and
γ are site labels within the three-site block). In the present
case the eight possible configurations can be given using by
only three parameters due to the symmetries and compati-
bility conditions. These configuration probabilities are deter-
mined by solving a set of differential equations expressing the
derivative of p3(sα, sβ , sγ) with respect to time (denoted as
p˙3(sα, sβ , sγ)). The main difficulties in the application of this
method comes from the fact that the contribution of the ele-
mentary processes (here strategy adoption between two neigh-
boring sites) to the quantity p˙3(sα, sβ, sγ) depend on the con-
figuration containing seven sites.
s1 s2
sy
s
x
s3 s4
s5
FIG. 9: Strategy adoption from sy to sx (marked by an arrow) will
modify the three-site configuration probabilities on triangles marked
by grey color. All the other neighbors influencing the payoff differ-
ence are denoted by grey circles.
8Figure 9 illustrates an elementary process with the neigh-
borhood affecting the probability of strategy adoption from
site y to x. This process decreases p˙3(sx, sy, s3) and simulta-
neously increases p˙3(sy, sy, s3) with a value
∆p = Wp7(s1, . . . , s5) (2)
where W describes the payoff dependence defined by (1) and
p7(s1, . . . , s5) denotes the seven-site configuration probabil-
ity. For the the present connectivity structure the latter quan-
tity can be approximated by a Bayesian formula:
p7(s1, . . . , s5) ≃
p3(s1, s2, sy)p3(sy, sx, s3)p3(sx, s4, s5)
p1(sx)p1(sy)
(3)
where the one-site configuration probability in the denomina-
tor can be also expressed by the three-site configuration prob-
abilities as
p1(sα) =
∑
sβ ,sγ
p3(sα, sβ, sγ) . (4)
Summarizing the contribution of all the possible elementary
processes affecting the values of p˙3(sα, sβ, sγ) one can de-
rive a set of differential equations. Now we do not wish to
display the huge formulae depending only on the three-site
configuration probabilities due to approximative formula (3).
Instead of it we emphasize that one can easily develop a com-
puter algorithm to collect systematically all the contributions
and the resultant formulae can be used to find the stationary
solution(s) numerically for any values of parameters. In the
knowledge of the stationary solutions of the three-site con-
figuration probabilities the most relevant characteristic of the
stationary state can be evaluated, for example, ρ = p1(C).
Using this approach the b−K phase diagram was reproduced
qualitatively well in [20, 21].
In the present work this method is extended by substitut-
ing (sα,Kα) for sα where sα = C or D and Kα = K1 =
K − ∆K/2 or K2 = K + ∆K/2. This extension does not
influence the applicability of the above described method. Us-
ing only two initial adoption rules, it was possible to keep
the number of the feasible configurations low enough so that
the numerical solution of the differential equation system was
fairly fast. It turned out that this method is capable to repro-
duce all the relevant features characterizing the Darwinian se-
lection of the dynamical rules. For the quantitative analysis
we used small ∆K = 0.001 values to evaluate the position of
the attractor (K⋆) and the separatrix for any values of b.
The results are summarized and compared with the MC data
in Fig. 10. The predictions of the generalized mean-field ap-
proximation for the PD region are in excellent agreement with
MC data. As both approaches stated, there are two attractors
in a restricted interval of b where a separatrix marking the bor-
der of basins of attractors tends to b = 1 ifK decreases. It also
means that the basin of attractor K⋆ ≈ 0 keeps getting wider
with increasing b. When separatrix reaches the other fixed
point the latter disappears resulting a unique fixed point in the
large b region. Turning to the SH side, the dynamical cluster
approximation predicts increasing K⋆ fixed point as we leave
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FIG. 10: (color online) Positions of fixed points of adoption rules on
b−K plane as predicted by MC simulation (top) and three-site clus-
ter approximation (bottom) for kagome lattice. Bullets, connected
by solid (green) line, show the fixed point given by MC simulations.
The position of separatrix in the two-attractor region is denoted by
dashed (green) line. The borders of phases are marked by dashed-
dotted (blue) lines. In the lower panel solid (red) lines show the po-
sition of attractors while separatrix is denoted by dashed (red) lines.
Dashed-dotted (blue) lines mark the borders of phases.
b = 1, which is again in nice agreement with the MC results.
Further decreasing b, however, the approximation predicts a
small two-attractor region and finally the K⋆(b) function co-
incides with the phase boundary where ρ becomes 1.
Before evaluating the predictions of the present cluster
mean-field approach, we should stress that the simpler (two-
state) version of the three-site approximation, which is valid
for homogeneous K case, cannot describe correctly the func-
tions ρ(K) as well as bc1(K) in the low K limit. Namely,
the border of all C phase tends to b = 0.75 instead of b = 1
when K → 0. (According to this, defectors can survive the
deterministic limit when b < 1.) Such a qualitative failure
of the approximation might have been the consequence of the
small number of independent variables. In other words, the re-
stricted freedom prevents the approximation to find the valid
solution. At the same time, if we increase the number of in-
dependent variables by letting different Ki values for players,
the approximation is already capable to find the relevant solu-
9tion (at least in the vicinity of b = 1). Our argument is sup-
ported by the fact that the five-site approximation for the ho-
mogeneous K model can also describe the behavior bc1 → 1
in the K → 0 limit. The relevant increase in bc1 can remove
the artifact(s) occurred at low b values. Summing up, the ex-
tension of the three-site approximation by letting different Ki
values was capable to indicate the correct results of the more
sophisticated approximation based on larger cluster of sites.
VI. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
We studied evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt
games on two representative two-dimensional lattices. The
underlying structures were the square lattice and the kagome
lattice exemplifying spatial connectivity structures without or
with triangle percolation. We analyzed the simultaneous evo-
lutions of strategy and a player specific noise parameter used
by individuals in the strategy imitation processes. It turned out
that players prefer to use the same distinguished noise level,
namely the same way of strategy adoption and the fixed points
of the adoption parameter are systematically close to those pa-
rameter values which are the most favorable for cooperation
for the PD games. It implies that the evolution of the adop-
tion parameter drives the population to a state which assures
substantial cooperation within the coexistence region. In the
region of SH game the maximum average payoff is achieved
at the peripheries of the coexistence region. It is shown that in
the latter case the Darwinian selection favors the edge of co-
existence region where the noise level (K) is lower. The pref-
erence of the lower noise level can also be observed within
the PD region because the distinguished rule K⋆ was always
smaller than that where the maximum average payoff (or co-
operator density) occurs for homogeneous dynamical rules at
fixed payoff. The above results raise many general questions
about the main features of states (including many aspects of
the model itself) favored by the Darwinian selection. Here we
emphasize that the Darwinian selection seems to be more ef-
ficient within the coexistence region where the simultaneous
evolution of strategies accelerates the evolution of adoption
rules, too. The latter observation is confirmed by simulations
where the coexistence in maintained artificially by introduc-
ing rare mutations in the systems.
The above investigations have required to improve the ac-
curacy particularly in the low noise limit where the relaxation
time diverges. The systematic investigation of the coopera-
tor’s density versus b (temptation to choose defection) and K
have indicated different types of non-analytical behaviors in
the limit b → 1 and K → 0 as Figs. 6 and 7 show. At
the same time we found qualitatively similar behavior on both
structures in the region of SH game. Although most of these
features can be reproduced qualitatively well by the dynam-
ical cluster methods on sufficiently large cluster of sites, we
think that further analysis is required to clarify the effects of
the sucker’s payoff S, topology of connectivity network, and
dynamics (e.g., when irrational choices are forbidden) on the
non-analytical behavior appeared here at b = 1 and K = 0.
The present investigations have expanded the research of
coevolutionary game theory by applying Darwinian selection
among a continuous set of noise levels in dynamical rules
used by the individuals while other relevant ingredients of the
model were fixed. In most of the previous studies of the co-
evolutionary games only two ingredients of the system were
allowed to evolve simultaneously. Recently, Van Segbroeck
et al. have studied a model where the players could mod-
ify three quantities: their strategy, connections, and the way
how a new partner is chosen [24]. In the light of the latter
model one can ask what happens if the payoff parameter b
is also considered as an individual property (bx) and it can
be adopted from the neighbors as well as the strategy sx and
dynamical rule Kx. The preliminary MC results have indi-
cated that within the strategy coexistence region of the b−K
plane the system evolves toward K⋆(b) with favoring smaller
b values. It is found that the system evolves fast toward a
state where players use game of the lower b value and subse-
quently the homogenization in Kx will be done as described
above. This means that the Darwinian selection prefers SH to
PD game, that is, the system develops an environment where
the mutual cooperation (providing the maximum average pay-
off) can be achieved more conveniently. Similar results were
reported by Worden and Levin [32] and also by Fort [15] who
studied models with different adoptions of payoff parameters.
Evidently, other results can be obtained if the simultaneous
evolution of the connectivity structure (interaction and learn-
ing networks [33]) is also possible.
In principle, all the ingredients of the multi-agent coevolu-
tionary games can be the subject of Darwinian selection if we
assume that these features are determined by the participants.
In that case the system can evolve towards a strategy distri-
bution with a proper connectivity structure, payoff parame-
ter, adoption rule(s), mutation, etc., that are preferred by the
Darwinian selection. As a consequence the given Darwinian
selection will show us the preferred features (or parameter val-
ues) we can fix when exploring the effect of other properties
[34]. To be more precise, the K⋆ value(s) can be suggested in
numerical simulations if one wish to fix the noise level.
Finally we would like to mention that in many real systems
besides the evolving individual’s features there are external
conditions affecting the system behavior. For example, the
noise itself can arise from external sources as it was inves-
tigated by Traulsen [35] and Perc [36]. Further systematic
investigations are required to clarify the effect of the external
noise or any other questions mentioned above.
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